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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact that fiscal policy has on economic activity 
and sovereign debt during economic downturns in the euro area, mainly 
Germany and Spain.  Our theoretical and empirical framework shows that the 
feasibility of austerity measures depends crucially on the values of the fiscal 
multipliers.  We find that, for the Spanish economy, even if policy makers just 
focus on the public debt ratio, ignoring output and unemployment, policies of 
deficit reduction are self-defeating. In fact, counter cyclical policies beat deficit 
consolidation policies in driving the sovereign debt ratio to a more sustainable 
path, no matter if shocks are on aggregate supply or aggregate demand. By 
contrast, in the German case, we cannot reject the hypothesis that austerity 
may be the proper alternative in a sluggish economy.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It has already been five years since the so-called global Great Recession 
started (2008). Over this period, most developed economies have suffered 
increasing unemployment, soaring fiscal deficits, rising financial spreads, 
mounting sovereign debt and decreasing output. Countries that had been 
presented not that long ago as the paradigm of fiscal responsibility have been 
either bailed out (Ireland) or found themselves in the midst of a huge depression 
(Spain).  
 
In order to have a proper understanding of the evolution of the global economy 
during the last years, it is essential to comprehend the role played by the public 
sector. It was not until 2010 that austerity measures were implemented; in fact, 
when the economic turmoil of 2008 became evident, expansionary fiscal 
programs were jointly undertaken across USA, Europe and Japan. However, 
such programs, along with the efforts to stabilize the financial system and the 
role of “automatic stabilizers” pushed fiscal deficits to frightening levels, raised 
the borrowing costs and rocketed the ratio of sovereign debt to GDP.  
 
Christina D. Romer (2012) points out the two main lessons regarding fiscal 
policy learned during the crisis. First, fiscal policy actions have a relevant impact 
on the economy in the short run; moreover, such effects are in the standard 
direction (fiscal expansions are output expansionary and vice versa). Second, 
unsustainable fiscal deficits lead to a collapse of the economy. Scared about 
the latter and partially forced by the pressure from bond markets, policymakers 
across the European Union shifted their main policy target to stabilizing the 
public debt ratio. In order to achieve so, austerity measures were implemented. 
 
There are two main views regarding the effects of austerity programs on the 
real economy. On the one hand, the hypothesis that fiscal consolidation 
improves the government’s solvency, restoring confidence among investors, 
businesses and households; which revives economic growth in a short period of 
time. Latvia is used as an example of the success of austerity since, after 
seeing its economy shrunk by 24% for two years during the financial crisis, the 
government carried out a strict stabilization program that  managed to get its 
economy back on track. 
 
However, many economists believe that when the economy has a huge amount 
of slack resources and the aggregate demand is weak, the public sector should 
carry on spending while the private sector recovers its balance. In this situation, 
the risk of crowding out private investment would be void as a result of the slack 
resources.  According to this view, far from managing to reduce the budget 
deficit, austerity worsens public accounts, since policies of deficit reduction 
depress the economy further reducing tax revenue, rising social spending and 
4 
 
exacerbating creditworthiness problems. Thus, the collapse in economic activity 
would make austerity self-defeating.  
 
This “philosophical” debate has translated into a more “technical” one regarding 
the role of the so-called fiscal multiplier. The fiscal multiplier captures the effects 
that variations in the fiscal policy, both through taxes and public expenditure, 
have on final output. Analytically it may be express as: 
 
 Output Fiscal Policy    
where β is the fiscal multiplier. Then, it is easy to see that, the larger the 
multiplier, the more harmful the fiscal consolidation is.  
 
Since the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (October 2012), stated that the values 
given to such fiscal multipliers could have been “too low”, there has been a lot 
of discussion about the viability of austerity and its actual impact on the 
economy. In the models used in 2010 to recommend austerity, fiscal multipliers 
were supposed to be around 0.5. However, the latest studies claim that the 
actual values may be between 0.7 and 1.91 (See Baum and Koester, (2011) 
and Burriel et al. (2010)). If this is really the case, it would mean that the effects 
of fiscal consolidation in variables as unemployment or output would be twice or 
even three times larger than expected; which would help to explain why in 
Spain or Portugal aggregate demand collapsed and unemployment soared after 
implementing austerity measures. 
 
Despite the broad range of estimates, there are, indeed, some common 
conclusions to most analysis: (i) fiscal multipliers are larger in downturns than in 
expansions, since in a sluggish economy the probability of government 
spending crowding out private consumption-investment is not significant due to 
the fact that excess resources are available in the economy (Baum, Ribeiro and 
Weber, 2012). (ii) Fiscal consolidations based on spending are less 
contractionary than through taxes, and (iii) front-load consolidation have greater 
contractionary effects than back-load austerity, since it shifts down the 
aggregate demand drastically.  
 
This paper has as a chief objective to analyze the impact that the 
implementation of different fiscal policies has on output, unemployment, inflation 
and sovereign debt during economic recessions.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, October 2012 
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2. THE MODEL 
The model represents the dynamics of an open economy integrated in a 
currency area. Throughout the entire paper we assume that all the trading 
partners take part within the currency area; therefore whatever may happen 
outside the monetary union is irrelevant for our analysis.  
 
2.1. AGGREGATE DEMAND  
The goods market equilibrium condition is: 
(1) Y D G NX    
where Y represents output, D stands for private demand, G is the public 
expenditure and NX is the trade of balance or net exports (exports minus 
imports).  D and NX are given by: 
(2) ( , , , , , )D D Y T r E u v
     
  
(3) ( , ) ( , , , , , )f iNX X E Y M E Y T r u v
       
 
 
where Yf-i is the output of the rest of the currency area, Τ is the tax rate, r is the 
real interest rate, u is the unemployment rate, v is the state of confidence and E 
measures the country's international competitiveness as the ratio of foreign 
inflation ( f i ) to national inflation( i ): 
(4)
f i
i
E


  
It seems reasonable to assume that the volume of exports varies positively with 
E as well as with Yf-i, since the lower the relative price of domestic goods and 
the larger the international market, the greater the foreign demand for national 
commodities. Likewise, the volume of imports depends positively on Y and v 
and negatively on E, T, r and u.   
 
We can rewrite (1) as: 
 
(5) ( , , , , , ) ;f iY D E Y Y T u v G D D NX     
 
Dmay be interpreted as the private total (national and international) demand for 
domestic products. 
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We could compute the total differential of (5) expressing it in terms of relative 
changes of the different variables2: 
 
( )
(6)
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
( )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
f i
f i f i f i
T r E Y
f i
Y Y Y Y
u v
Y Y Y
Y DTD D r r EDY Y T T E E Y Y
Y Y D T Y D Y D E Y D Y
D u u vDG G G v v
Y D G Y D Y D v

  

   
      
   
 
    
  
 
Defining lnx X  for  , , , ,f ix Y T E Y G  and taking into account that:  
 ln
X X X
x x
X X

   
 We may express (6) as:  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
7
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(ln ln )
f i f iy y e e r r y y t t g g u u
v v
     

             
 
 
where:  
 
1 2 3 4
´
5 6 7
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
E r T
Y Y Y Y
u v
Y Y Y
ED D TD
Y D Y D D Y D
D vDG
Y D Y D Y D
   
  
   
   
  
  
 
 
We assume that in the long run:  
 
(8) 1 ln 0f i i E e E        
 
Then, in the short term: 
 
(9) ln lnf i ie      
 
As a result of labour market rigidities, we assume that unemployment does not 
react automatically to changes on output, so there is a lag. Then: 
 
1(10) ( ) ; 0t tu u a y y a     
 
Regarding fiscal policy, spending and taxes paths are given by: 
                                                 
2
 Throughout the entire analysis, a bar over a variable represents the long run level of such 
variable. 
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1(11) ( ) ( )t t tg g u u d d        
 
1(12) ( ) ( )t t tt t u u d d        
 
where d is the primary government budget balance; excluding interest 
payments. Expansionary fiscal policies require θ to be positive, μ negative and ε 
and ω close to zero. On the other hand, austerity measures demand ε to be 
positive, ω negative and θ and μ near zero.   
 
As for monetary policy, common to the whole currency area, the nominal 
interest rate (ip) is set following: 
 
(13) * ln
*
f
p fi r h

  

 
 
where *r  is the risk free interest rate in the long run, f  is the overall inflation 
rate of the currency area and h is a positive parameter meaning that the central 
bank undertakes a “tight” monetary policy when inflation is above its target and 
a “loose” monetary policy in the opposite situation. f  follows:  
 
1
(14)
in
f i
f
i
Y
Y
    
 
Throughout our analysis we assume that f i  is defined as: 
 
(15) * ( )f i f i f iY Y       
 
Assuming that: 
 
(16) *r r    
 
(17) p fr i     
 
Where ρ stands for premium risk and inserting (16) into (13) and then (13) into 
(17): 
 
(18) ( ) ln
*
f
r r h 

   

 
 
8 
 
In addition, we link the country's premium risk (or spread) to the amount of 
sovereign debt, assuming there is some correlation between the size of the debt 
ratio and the perceived possibility of default. Then: 
 
1(19) ( ) ; 0t tb b        
 
 where b is the ratio national debt over output. Inserting (19) into (18), we obtain 
the path followed by the real interest rate: 
 
1(20) ( ) ln
*
f
tr r b b h 

   

 
 
Inserting (9), (11), (12) and (20) into (7):  
 
1 2 1 3
4 1 5 1 6
7
(21) (ln ln ) ( ) (ln ln *) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(ln ln )
f i i f f i f i
y t t t t t
t t t t t
t
y y b b h y y
u u d d u u d d u u
v v
   
      

  

 
              
               
 
 
 
Using the definition ln    and solving for the domestic inflation, we rewrite 
(21) as: 
 
32 2
1
1 1 1 1
4 5 6 4 5 7
1
1 1 1
1
(22) ( ) ( ) ( *) ( )
( ) ( ) (ln ln )
i f i f f i f i
t t t t t t
t t
y y b b h y y
u u d d v v
 
    
   
         
  
  


         
  
     
 
 
Finally, subtracting π* from both sides of the equation (22) we obtain the 
aggregate demand:  
 
2
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
(23) * ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )it t t t t t
m
y y b b u u d d z
 
  
    
             
Where 
4 5 6
4 5m
     
   
  
 
 
1 2 3 7( *) ( *) ( ) (ln ln )
f i f f i f i
t t t tz h y y v v       
           
 
We expect λ to be negative, since when unemployment is above its natural rate, 
aggregate consumption is weak, and therefore prices fall. Likewise, m has to be 
greater than zero, since a consolidated balance budged should have positive 
effects on output gap, by lowering the real interest rate and the bond spread.  
 
9 
 
2.2. AGGREGATE SUPPLY 
 
A conventional Phillip's Curve is adopted as the aggregate supply: 
 
1(24) ( )
i i i i
t t t ty y s       
 
Where the term st captures supply shocks.  
 
2.3. PUBLIC DEBT DYNAMICS  
 
Assuming that the government cannot appeal to the monetary authority to 
monetize the national debt, the sovereign debt ratio evolves according to: 
 
1(25) (1 )
p
t t t t t tb d i n b        
 
Where n is the real growth rate. The evolution of the sovereign debt is driven by 
both the balance budget and the snowball effect, which is the difference 
between the nominal interest rate and the nominal GDP growth rate. Notice that 
a higher inflation both diminishes the stock of debt and the cyclical components 
of deficit, since it boosts output, reduce unemployment cost and raises tax 
revenues.  
 
2.4. SOLVING THE MODEL  
 
The model may be summarized by: 
 
2
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 7
1
1
1 1
: * ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( *) ( *) ( ) (ln ln )
: ( )
: (1 )
i
t t t t t t
f i f f i f i
t t t t
i i i i
t t t t
p
t t t t t t
m
AD y y b b u u d d z
z h y y v v
AS y y s
Together with b d i n b
 
  
    
       
  

 
  


          
       
   
     
 
 
Solving it for the output gap and the inflation gap, we obtain the dynamics of 
both variables over time: 
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 
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 1 1
(26) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )
(27) * ( *) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
t t t t t t t t t t t
i i
t t t t t t t
y y y y b b u u m d d z z s
b b u u m d d z s
    
        
      
  
             
             
 
Where: 
1
1
1

 


 
 
The path which should be taken by the fiscal policy during economic downturns 
depends on which of either effects on output gap dominants, whether it is the 
contractive influence of the mounting sovereign debt (given by β2 and ϕ) or 
whether it is the expansionary effect of  a “Keynesian fiscal policy” (given by α 
and m). The answer to this question lies on the value of fiscal multipliers and 
the credit market access for public institutions, businesses and households. 
 
2.5. UNDERSTANDING THE MODEL  
 
In order to fully understand the model, Table 2 offers a simple definition of all 
the relevant parameters.  
 
Table 1. Relevant Parameters of the Model 
 
 Definition 
β1 It captures the effect of inflation differentials on output gap.  
β2 It measures the impact that changes in the real interest rate have 
on output gap. 
β3 How sensitive domestic output is to changes in the international 
environment. 
β4 How aggregate demand responds to changes in taxes. 
β5 How aggregate demand responds to changes in government 
spending.  
β6 Impact of changes in the unemployment rate on output gap.  
β7 It captures the effects of state of confidence on domestic 
production.  
γ It is the slope of the aggregate supply.  
a It measures how unemployment reacts to output gap (Okun’s Law). 
Ω It measures the impact of euro zone output on the common 
inflation.   
h How sensitive the nominal interest rate is to changes on inflation. 
ϕ It captures the effect of sovereign debt on risk premium.  
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β1 is expected to be greater than zero, due to the fact that a rise in national 
inflation worsens external competitiveness and the balance trade. In fact, the 
greater β1, the stronger the reaction of net exports to variations in the relative 
inflation and therefore the faster the economy converges to its long term output 
level. 
 
Regarding β2, its sign is determined by three effects: 
 Wealth effect. For countries with a net external asset position, the 
wealth effect is positively correlated with the real interest rate, since a 
rise in the latter implies an increase in interests received from the rest of 
the world. But when there is a net external debt, a raise in the interest 
rate has a negative wealth effect.   
 Intertemporal-substitution effect.  A rise in the interest rate stimulates 
individuals to work more in the current period. 
 The cost of borrowing: it rises with the interest rate; therefore, there is a 
negative relationship between investment demand and interest rates.  
The size and direction of these effects determines whether β2 is positive or 
negative. 
 
Under no circumstance should we expect β3 to take a negative value. The 
degree of openness and the trade geographical diversification, among others, 
determine the size of this parameter.  Since a tax increase means a reduction in 
the disposable income and therefore a contraction in consumption and savings, 
β4 is expected to be negative. A rise in government spending increases 
aggregate demand; hence, β5 is expected to be positive.  It is plain to see that 
β6 must be lower than zero since a rise in unemployment reduces disposable 
income. Regarding β7, due to the fact that the variable state of confidence is not 
observable; we use it to introduce demand shocks that are not encompassed in 
our model such a change in the consumers' preferences or liquidity constrains. 
 
The slope of the aggregate supply is crucial to determine the performance of 
the economy. The final impact of spending cuts or raising taxes will not only 
depend on the fiscal multipliers (shifts on AD) but on the slope of the 
aggregate supply.  
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3. CALIBRATION  
 
Our analysis is focused on just two economies: Germany and Spain. 
Nevertheless, we also provide the parameters for Finland, France and Portugal 
to facilitate comparisons. Such a sample enables us to study the differences 
between the economies from the North and South of Europe. Table 2 shows our 
estimations for all relevant parameters3. 
 
Table 2. The Empirical Model  
 
 Country Specific Euro Zone 
Parameter
4 
Finland France Germany Portugal Spain   
 
β1 
 1,08 0,74 0,32 1,05 0,95 - 
β2  
 -0,10 -0,15 -0,04 -0,08 -0,13 - 
β3 1,30 1,89 0,71 1,56 1,80 - 
β4 -0,96 -1,43 -0,58 -1,29 -1,35 - 
β5 0,68 1,01 0,34 0,69 0,74 - 
β6 -1,98 -2,72 -2,72 -3,73 -1,17 - 
β7 - - - - - 0,50 
γ 0,18 0,26 0,21 - 0,21 - 
a -0,50 -0,37 -0,37 -0,27 -0,85 - 
Ω - - - - - 0,25 
h - - -  - 0,58 
ϕ 0,03 0,02 - 0,01 0,02 - 
 
At a first glance, the values obtained for β3 may look odd; being the German or 
the Finnish economies more linked with international markets, its output should 
be more dependent on the international environment than, for instance, the 
                                                 
3
 In this section, we just summarize our findings. A deeper description of the estimation 
methodology can be found in the Appendix.   
 
4
 Regarding the sample period: 
 β1, β2, β3, β4 and β5 have been calculated using quarterly data from 1995 to 2011. 
 Both β6 and a have been taken from the paper: Okun’s Law: Fit 50, by Ball, Leigh and 
Loungani (2012). They used annual data from 1980 to 2011. 
  Both γ and Ω have been calculated using annual data from 1980 to 2011. 
  “h” has  been taken from the paper: Does the ECB rely on a Taylor Rule? - Comparing 
Ex-Post with Real Time Data, by Belke and Klose (2011). The quarterly data covers the 
sample period 1999 to 2010(Q2). 
 ϕ has been obtained using annual data from 1995 to 2012 
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Spanish economy. The answer to this puzzle might be obtained from the 
following: 
 Their exports are characterized by high quality and technological content, 
so international demand for their products is more inelastic.  
 Their exports are highly diversified across countries and continents; while 
the Spanish or Portuguese exports are more focused on the euro area.  
Regarding fiscal multipliers (β4 and β5), it is plain to see that increasing taxes in 
the South (Spain, Portugal, and even France) is much more contractionary than 
in the North (Germany and Finland). Likewise, public spending cuts have a 
stronger negative impact in the South than in Germany. The combination of 
these two facts will explain why austerity measures could work out in Germany 
but, not in Spain or Portugal. Notice that these results give us some clues about 
whether austerity is a “universal recipe” to the crisis, or whether some countries 
would be better off if countercyclical policies were implemented. In any case, for 
all countries,  we find that fiscal consolidation based on spending is less 
contractionary than through taxes. 
With respect to the Okun’s Law, Spain is the country where the ratio of change 
in unemployment to variations in output is larger, a measure of labor rigidities. 
This may be explained by the fact that temporary contracts are more common in 
the Spanish labor market, so that firms find easier to adjust employment rather 
than wages in the face of output variations (Ball, Leigh and Loungani, 2012).  
Finally, concerning the credit market, we find a positive correlation between 
sovereign debt and the risk premium but with different coefficients across 
countries. Spanish and Portuguese are more volatile, and their deviations are 
not necessarily due to mounting sovereign debt. That is the reason why we 
obtain a lower ϕ for southern countries.   
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4. SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
In this section, we analyze the consequences of demand and supply shocks for 
Germany and Spain. In our simulations, fiscal policy may follow three different 
paths5: 
 The government implements counter cyclical policies; lowering taxes and 
increasing spending when unemployment is below its natural level and 
vice versa.  
 The government’s main goal is to balance its budget. Thus, if there is a 
budget deficit in the previous period, the government will raise taxes 
and/or cut spending, and vice versa.  
 The government follows a fixed fiscal policy regardless the economic 
situation.  
 
Through the analysis we assume without loss of generality that: 
 The structural deficit is zero. 
 The initial ratio stock of sovereign debt over GDP is 40% 
 The long run economic growth is 2% 
 The inflation target is 2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Recall from equations 10 and 11 that we could simulate the implementation of different fiscal 
policies by modifying θ, ε, μ and ω. For our analysis, we assume that: 
 
 Counter Cyclical policies  θ=- μ=0,4 and ε=ω=0   
 
 Austerity Measures   ε=- ω=0,4 and θ= μ=0 
 
 No Fiscal Policy   θ = μ = ε = ω = 0 
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4.1. NEGATIVE DEMAND SHOCKS  
 
It is highly reasonable to think that the current economic turmoil partly has its 
origin in strong negative demand shocks6. In the face of such kind of shocks, 
our model predicts7:  
 
Figure 1. Negative Demand Shocks: Output Gap 
   
 
Figure 2. Negative Demand Shocks: Unemployment (deviations from its natural 
rate) 
 
                                                 
6
 In 2008 Spain’s housing bubble burst which, combined with the international liquidity 
restriction, had a strong negative effect in confidence, employment, consumption and 
investment demand. 
 
7
 Notice from equation 7 that by modifying vt we can simulate internal demand shocks. In fact, 
the same equation allows us to recreate external demand shocks by modifying  f i f iy y  . 
Since the outcome from our model is quite similar for both shocks; we just simulate the external 
demand shocks in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible. Thus, we impose that  
   
1 2
0,015f i f i f i f iy y y y         
 
Spain Germany 
Spain Germany 
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Figures 1 and 2 replicate the observed stylized facts of the current economic 
turmoil: 
 
i. As a result of its low fiscal multipliers, the impact of counter cyclical fiscal 
policies in Germany is low; in other words, such policies are not effective 
and austerity measures are innocuous. 
 
ii. Austerity measures have a fatal impact on Spanish real variables, both in 
terms of intensity and duration. As a matter of fact, the economy 
performs better under no fiscal policy than under policies of deficit 
reduction. On the other hand, counter cyclical policies works in stabilizing 
the economy, improving output gaps and unemployment and achieving a 
faster recovery.  
 
iii. Spain’s unemployment is highly sensitive to output. Therefore, austerity 
measures cause a harmful feedback on public accounts: policies of 
deficit reduction contracts the economy, raising unemployment, reducing 
tax revenues and increasing public spending (“automatic stabilizers”). As 
a result of the deterioration of the public accounts, further austerity is 
needed to balance the budget, which contracts the economy even more, 
increasing unemployment… 
 
To sum up, according to our model, in economies with relatively high fiscal 
multipliers, as the Spanish one, policies of deficit reduction are totally unfeasible 
as a result of the strong contraction on economic activity; in other words 
austerity measures are self-defeating. In fact, the economy would be better off 
in the absence of any kind of fiscal authority. Nevertheless, when the fiscal 
multipliers are relatively low, policies of deficit consolidation may be a proper 
solution.   
 
4.2. NEGATIVE SUPPLY SHOCKS 
 
Supply shocks are those facts that have an impact in the production function 
and/or production process, like liquidity restrictions and high input prices. In the 
face of such situation, our model predicts8: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Recall from equation 23 that by modifying s t we can simulate supply shocks. In this case, we 
assume that s1= 0,02 
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Figure 3. Negative Supply Shocks: Output Gap 
 
  
 
Figure 4. Negative Supply Shocks: Unemployment (deviations from its natural 
rate) 
 
 
 
In the face of a negative supply shock, counter cyclical fiscal policies 
undoubtedly perform better than austerity measures. One could see austerity as 
a tradeoff between short-term pain and long-term gain; arguing that even if 
fiscal consolidations are quite harmful during the economic downturns, the 
recoveries are much stronger; therefore, policies of deficit reduction are justified 
for the sake of a brighter future.  However, there are several facts that 
undermine such argument: 
 
i. Households want their consumption path to be as smooth as possible 
over time. If capital markets imperfections were null, oscillations in output 
or unemployment would not be a problem, since households could freely 
lend or borrow to achieve a flat consumption stream. Unfortunately, 
Spain; Output Gap Germany; Output Gap 
Spain Germany 
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capital markets do have limitations; hence fluctuations which cause an 
uneven income stream affect negatively the welfare of individuals. 
  
ii. Long term unemployed individuals may lose their work skills, becoming 
unemployable. Hence, unemployment becomes a structural problem.   
 
iii. During recession, income losses are concentrated in the poorer 
individuals, while during expansion the upper part of the income scale 
captures a larger part of the gains. Therefore, ample fluctuations 
increase economic and social inequality. 
 
iv. Large output oscillations make more complicated to achieve price 
stability; hence, they increase the risk of shrinking people’s savings, 
distorting the tax system, causing a loss of business confidence… 
 
v. Delong and Summers (2012) points out that recessions have long run 
negative effects, since they reduce investment, increase structural 
unemployment… Thus, there is a clear link between current and future 
potential output.  
 
Thus, it is reasonable to think that high volatility on the economic cycle reduces 
social welfare. From this approach, counter cyclical policies seem to be 
recommended, since the economy is more stable. 
 
4.3. A COMBINATION OF SHOCKS: THE GREAT RECESSION  
 
Since the financial crisis started back at 2008, the vast majority of economies 
across the European Union have experienced negative supply shocks, like 
strong liquidity restrictions for business, and negative demand shocks like 
bursting housing bubbles or the fall in exports demand as a result of the global 
recession that has kept output below its trend. This experiment recreates the 
current economic situation9: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Following the same process as before, we assume that s1=s2= 0,02 and 
   
1 2
0,015f i f i f i f iy y y y         
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Figure 5. The Great Recession: Output Gap  
                                                           
  
Figure 6. The Great Recession: Unemployment (deviations from its natural rate) 
 
  
  
As in the two previous simulations, austerity measures fails to stabilize the 
economy having, especially in Spain, extremely fatal effects on output and 
unemployment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain Germany 
Spain Germany 
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5. MAY AUSTERITY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE?  
 
In the previous section, we saw how austerity could be self-defeating in terms of 
economic activity when fiscal multipliers were relatively high, as in the Spanish 
case. However, many would argue that fiscal expansions finance current 
spending with future revenues, mounting sovereign debt, which is irresponsible 
and “unfair” for future generations. Under this view, fiscal consolidations, even if 
they cause real losses and strong pain in the short term, are the proper way to 
act since they stabilize the debt ratio. Nevertheless, such view does not take 
into account the fact that both real growth and inflation reduce the debt ratio, 
since they diminish the cyclical deficit and the denominator of such ratio. 
Therefore, even if austerity measures are successful in reducing the structural 
fiscal deficit, they may erode both the cyclical component of the public deficit 
and the debt ratio to GDP. The following simulations show that in Germany the 
results are not conclusive. However, in Spain austerity policies are clearly 
counterproductive, since the debt ratio worsens with consolidation policies.  
 
Figure 7. Negative Demand Shocks: Spanish Inflation Rate and Sovereign Debt 
Dynamics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inflation Rate Debt Ratio 
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Figure 8. Negative Supply Shocks: Spanish Inflation Rate and Sovereign Debt 
Dynamics  
 
  
 
Figure 9. The Great Recession: Spanish Inflation Rate and Sovereign Debt 
Dynamics 
 
  
 
As a result of the fatal impact that austerity has on ouput and inflation, fiscal 
consolidation are unable to stabilize the debt ratio in the Spanish economy. 
Policies of deficit reduction do not manage neither to balance the budget nor to 
reduce the old debt burden; making them ineffective. On the other hand, 
counter cyclical policies do succeed in stabilizing both output and inflation. That 
is the reason why, in the Spanish case, counter cyclical policies drive the 
debt to a more sustainable path than policies of deficit consolidation; in 
other words, transitory expansionary fiscal policies are self-financing during 
economic downturns.  
 
Despite the fact that Keynesian fiscal policies generally perform better than 
austerity during recession, we should consider the possibility that under certain 
Inflation Rate 
Inflation Rate 
Debt Ratio 
Debt Ratio 
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conditions fiscal consolidations may be the feasible alternative. Exact 
specification of those certain conditions is not within this paper. However, we 
can point out some of their characteristics 
 
i. Origin of the Shock. Advance economies are extremely complex, which 
makes them to face an extraordinary large number of exogenous shocks. 
Each shock must be met differently, since they have asymmetric features 
and properties. For instance, liquidity restrictions in the credit market 
must not be confronted with the same set of policies as the busting 
housing bubble.  
 
ii. Duration and Intensity of the Shock. According to our model, the shorter 
and lighter the crisis, the more likely austerity measures are to succeed.   
 
iii. Fiscal Multipliers. The impact that variations in fiscal policy have on the 
real economy are highly dependent on the fiscal multipliers. Hence, for 
economies with relatively low fiscal multipliers, austerity is more likely to 
succeed. Notice that economies with high price rigidities, like Spain, tend 
to have higher fiscal multipliers since producers react to augments in 
aggregate demand by raising prices, not by increasing output. On the 
other hand, the more open the economy, the lower the fiscal multipliers, 
since part of the effects of the fiscal policy leak abroad (Boussard, De 
Castro and Salto, 2012).   
 
iv. Zero Lower Bound. Policies of deficit reduction might be justified when 
the risk of crowding out private investment is real. Nevertheless, note 
that during economic downturns the output gap is negative and the 
inflation is likely to be below its target; forcing central banks to undertake 
“loose” monetary policies. Thus, if the nominal interest rate is close to 
zero, government spending helps to raise inflation expectations, lowering 
the real interest rate, and then, boosting consumption and investment.  
 
Thus, there is not a “universal recipe” to face all kinds of shocks. Furthermore, 
blueprint across countries is not a feasible option, due to the fact that political, 
economic and social institutions are heterogeneous. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
When austerity measures were first implemented in the European Union back in 
2010, there was a clear objective: to reduce governments’ debts and deficits, 
boosting international competitiveness and business confidence. Austerity 
measures have had a fatal impact on economic activity within the euro area, 
mainly the southern countries. Unemployment has dramatically gone up, output 
has permanently decreased, poverty has increased… Sadly, much of the pain 
caused by austerity measures may have been in vain; almost four years later, 
not even one country has managed to significantly reduce its sovereign debt 
ratio after implementing policies of deficit consolidation.  
 
This paper tries to shed some light on the reasons of such a disappointing 
performance. Its main findings may be summarized as follows: 
 
 Overall, we find that counter cyclical policies work in stabilizing the 
economy, improving output gaps and unemployment and achieving a 
faster recovery. On the other hand, policies of deficit reduction collapse 
the aggregate demand, aggravating the initial impact of the shocks. 
Furthermore, fiscal consolidation based on spending is less 
contractionary than based on taxes.  
 
 The larger the fiscal multipliers, the more costly fiscal consolidation are. 
In economies with relatively high fiscal multipliers, like the Southern 
European countries, austerity measures are extremely painful and highly 
ineffective in the medium term.  
 
 Furthermore, in some cases, as in the Spanish one, fiscal consolidation 
is unable to stabilize the debt ratio given its impact on the cyclical 
component of the public deficit and on inflation and nominal growth. In 
fact, counter cyclical policies drive such ratio to a more sustainable path 
than austerity policies. 
To sum up, transitory fiscal policies are self-financing during recessions.  Thus, 
as John Maynard Keynes argued: “the boom, not the slump, is the right time for 
austerity”.  
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8. APPENDIX: ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY  
 
In this section, the process and mechanisms used to obtain all the parameters 
from our model are shown10.  
 
Estimating β1 
Recall that in our model: 
 
 
1 1
1
  
(1 ) 1
28
X M D
E
Y Y
M D
ED Y Y
Y D D
  
 
  
  
   
 
Where ηx, ηM and ηD are the exports, imports and private demand price 
elasticities. Both ηx and ηM are obtained from Trade Elasticities, a Final Report 
for the European Commission, by J. Imbs and Isabelle Méjean (2010).  
 
Table 3. Price Elasticities of Exports and  Imports 
 Sample ηx ηM 
Finland 1996-2000 1,62 -2,41 
France 1996-2000 1,67 -1,74 
Germany 1996-2000 1,67 -1,34 
Portugal 1996-2000 2,11 -1,37 
Spain 1996-2000 1,93 -1,72 
*Source: Trade Elasticities, a Final Report for the European Commission, 2010 
 
Regarding ηD, since imports account for about 30% of the aggregate demand, a 
1% rise in the relative price of imported goods may reduce the real purchasing 
power of households by 0,3%. Thus, we can assume that ηD=0,3. 
In order to compute the partial derivative of the total private demand for 
domestic products with respect to domestic output we set up: 
(29) Y
D D M
D
Y Y Y
  
  
  
 
To compute both derivatives from equation 29, we take as our instrumental 
                                                 
10
 Whenever we find that the error terms are correlated, we use the Newey-West estimators 
instead of ordinary least squares.  
Throughout the entire calibration process, the level of significance is 0,05, except in Table7 
where such value is 0,10.  
A bar over a variable represents the long run level of such variable. 
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variable the gross domestic product of the Euro Zone; using Two- Stage Least 
Squared.  
 
Table 4. Partial derivatives of Private Demand and Imports with respect to 
domestic GDP 
 
D
Y


 R-squared 
M
Y


 R-squared 
Finland 
0.78 
(0.01) 
0,99 
0.55 
(0.02) 
0,93 
France 
0.84 
(0.02) 
0,99 
0.37 
(0.01) 
0,94 
Germany 
0.57 
(0.01) 
0,98 
0.98 
(0.03) 
0,97 
Portugal 
0.8 
(0.02) 
0,98 
0.44 
(0.02) 
0,93 
Spain 
0.8 
(0.02) 
0,98 
0.36 
(0.02) 
0,94 
*Sample 1995:1-2011:4 
Standard errors are displayed in brackets. Inserting the estimates from Tables 3 
and 4 into (28), we obtain β1.  
 
Estimating  β2 
This parameter is defined as:  
  2   
(1 )
30
r
rD
Y D
 

 
 
In order to compute the partial derivative of the total private demand for 
domestic products with respect to the real interest rate, we set up: 
  1 231 (    )
D
TenYearsTreasuryYield
Y
s    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Table 5. Partial derivative of Total Demand for Domestic Products with respect 
to Ten Years Treasury Yields 
 α2 R-squared 
Finland 
-0.08 
(0.01) 
0,6 
France 
-0.08 
(0.01) 
0,59 
Germany 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
0,56 
Portugal 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
0,41 
Spain 
-0.07 
(0.01) 
0,47 
*Sample 1995:1-2011:4 
Inserting the data from Tables 4 and 5 into (30), we obtain β2.  
 
Estimating β3 
Recall that in the model,  
  3
1
(1 )
32
YD
 

 
 
Inserting the data from Table 4 into (32), we obtain β3 
 
Estimating β4 
In our model, 
  4   
( )
3
1
3
Y
TTD
Y D
 

 
 
The tax level is expressed as the fiscal pressure; defined as tax income over 
gross domestic product. We need to obtain the relationship between total 
private demand for national products and the tax level. In order to do so, the 
next regression is run: 
1 2 3(34)   ( ) (  )
D
FiscalPressure Tax Income
Y
      
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Table 6. Partial derivative of Total Demand for Domestic Products with respect 
to the Fiscal Pressure 
 α2 R-squared 
Finland 
-1.39 
(0.07) 
0,98 
France 
-1.52 
(0.06) 
0,99 
Germany 
-1.83 
(0.03) 
0,99 
Portugal 
-2.08 
(0.08) 
0,97 
Spain 
-1.97 
(0.10) 
0,98 
* Sample 1995:1-2011:4 
Inserting the data from Table 4 and 6 into (33), we obtain β4: 
 
Estimating β5 
 
This parameter is defined as: 
  5    
( )
5
1
3
Y
G
Y D
 

 
 
Inserting the data from Table 4 into (35), we obtain β5: 
 
Estimating β6 
 
As an approximation for β6 we use the results obtained by Ball, Leigh and 
Loungani in their paper:  Okun's Law: Fit 50? (2012).They set up the following 
relationship between unemployment and output: 
 
 36 *   ( )*U U Y Y      
 
Where U* and Y* are the natural rates based on Hodrick-Prescott filter. Their 
data covers goes from 1980 to 2011. Since we are interested in how deviations 
from the natural rate of unemployment affect the output gap, we may establish 
that β6=1/μ.  
 
Estimating a 
 
For our analysis we assume that a= 1/ β6. 
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Estimating Ω 
 
 37    
i
fi
Y
Y
   
 
where γi is the slope of the AS for each country and Yi /Yf measures the relative 
size of each economy in the currency area. For our analysis, almost the 17 
countries for the Euro Area are taken into account when computing Ω (only 
Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia are left out as a 
result of the lack of data for such countries). 
 
Table 7. Slope of Aggregate Supply Country by Country 
  
 γ R-squared 
 
Austria 
0.15 
(0.06) 
0,1 0,04 
Belgium 
0.23 
(0.13) 
0,1 0,05 
Cyprus - - 0 
Finland 
0.18 
(0.04) 
0,25 0,03 
France 
0.26 
(0.14) 
0,12 0,28 
Germany 
0.21 
(0.09) 
0,15 0,37 
Greece - - 0,03 
Ireland 
0.23 
(0.09) 
0,07 0,02 
Italy - - 0,23 
Netherlands 
0.35 
(0.14) 
0,15 0,08 
Portugal 
0.98 
(0.45) 
0,32 0,02 
Spain 
0.21 
(0.07) 
0,14 0,12 
*Sample 1980-2011 
 
Inserting the data from Table 7 into (37), we obtain Ω.  
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Estimating ϕ 
 
In order to obtain ϕ, we run the following regression: 
 
     1 0   (3    )8 Risk Premium yr Bonds Amount of SovereignDebt    
 
 
Where  
 
  '  1 0   
 1 0   
Risk Premium Country sGovernment yr BondYields
GermanGovernment yr BondYields


 
  
Notice that according to the above definition of Risk Premium (or spread) the 
German spread is always zero.  
 
Table 8. Estimating ϕ 
 
 ϕ R-squared 
Finland 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0,22 
France 
 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.25 
Portugal 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0,61 
Spain 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0,46 
*Sample 1980-2011 
 
 
